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SACRIFICING BURMA TO SAVE FREE TRADE:
THE BURMA FREEDOM ACT AND THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We
are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a
single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly,
affects all indirectly.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts enacted a law that
prohibits state agencies from purchasing goods and services from
2corporations contracting with Burma. Burma is a country in
Southeast Asia ruled by a military government notorious for
egregious human rights violations against its citizens, through such
practices as political killings, torture,4 and forced labor.5 At least
1. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 77 (1964) ("Letter
from the Birmingham Jail").
2. See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (West 1996
& Supp. 2001).
3. As noted by the Supreme Court in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), the Burmese government changed the name of
the country to Myanmar in 1989. The Supreme Court, however, followed the
decision of the Court of Appeals, which used the name Burma "since both
parties and amici curiae, the state law, and the federal law all do so." Id. at
366 n.1 (citing Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 45 n.1
(9th Cir. 1999)). Neither the Court, nor this author, intends the use of this term
to reflect a particular political opinion.
4. See Andrea Witt Sendlenski, Note, Taking Our Money and Going
Home: State Divestment Policy and the Foreign Affairs, Foreign Commerce,
and Supremacy Clauses, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 317, 322-23
(2001).
5. See Ako Miyaki-Murphy, Comment, In the Wake of Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council: The Impact Upon Selective Purchasing Legislation
Throughout the United States, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 827, 832 (2001).
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twenty-two jurisdictions in the United States have passed similar
laws.
6
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council.7 The decision declared the Massachusetts law and,
by inference, all similar state and municipal legislation
unconstitutional.8 One year later, identical bills were proposed in the
U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, 9 known as the
"Burma Freedom Act,"' 0 which aim to do almost exactly what the
Massachusetts law sought to accomplish. This Note first explores
the constitutional pitfalls of the Massachusetts law, then examines
the newly proposed federal bills, which avoid any such pitfalls, but
face a potential threat in the World Trade Organization.
Part II of this Note looks at the Massachusetts legislation in
three sections. The first section offers a brief modem history of
Burma, providing an understanding of what motivated the
Massachusetts government and the federal government to adopt such
regulatory legislation. The second section juxtaposes the recently
proposed Burma Freedom Act with the state law itself. The third
section considers the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Crosby, looking at Justice Souter's opinion for the Court and
examining the constitutional issues that forced Massachusetts to bury
its regulatory law, paying special attention to the federal statute that
preempted the Massachusetts law. This consideration aids in
determining whether the measures delineated in the proposed Burma
Freedom Act will pass the constitutional analysis conducted by the
Court in Crosby. Upon determining that it does, in fact, pass the
rigors of this test, this Note will look at the impact such legislation
might have on social change.
6. See id. at 838; see, e.g., Los ANGELES CITY COUNCIL, Burma
(Myanmar), DOCID 97-1861 (Nov. 21, 2000), available at
http://citycouncil.cityofla.org.
7. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
8. See id. at 372.
9. Burma Freedom Act, H.R. 2211, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001); S. 926,
107th Cong. § 1 (2001).
10. Although the title "Burma Freedom Act" is used in the House bill only,
the term will be used throughout this Note to refer to both the House bill and
the Senate bill for simplicity, as they are virtually identical in their purposes
and procedures.
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Part Il examines the next and potentially greatest threat to
federal trade sanction legislation and the freedom of our government
to create such legislation, a threat that might surface upon the
implementation of the Burma Freedom Act. This threat is from the
World Trade Organization (WTO), an international organization
which governs trade between nations and whose rules have the force
of law." Next, this section will analyze the principles and positions
of the WTO that explain its opposition to boycotts and its "business
first" ideal.' 2  This section then discusses whether such trade
sanction statutes are worth the effort, exploring the broader question
of whether sanctions are productive or counterproductive in the
global market. This discussion, coupled with the stance the WTO
takes regarding sanctions, will lead to a consideration of the potential
conflict that lies ahead if the United States decides to violate the
WTO and enforce the Burma Freedom Act. Following this analysis
of a potential conflict between the United States and the WTO, this
Note will consider measures the United States could take to prevent
WTO action.
In Part IV, this Note advocates a broader, more encompassing
humanitarian perspective when considering the role the United States
plays in the global market. It points to a realization that the world,
and the global market itself, is full of agencies that support boycotts
and the freedom to boycott, and one agency that does not but claims
to have the final word-the WTO.
11. See World Trade Organization, W7hat is the WTO?, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/whatise.htm (last visited Mar.
18, 2002).
12. See Christopher H. Smith, Hearing On "China, the WTO, and Human
Rights," (Dec. 8, 1999) at http://www.house.gov/intemationalrelations/
hr/wtochs.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Hearing] (stating that
"[t]he selective use of rhetoric denouncing 'unilateral sanctions' hides an
implicit prioritization of profits above fundamental human rights.").
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II. WHAT TANGLED WEBS WE WEAVE: FROM THE
MASSACHUSETTS LAW TO THE BURMA FREEDOM ACT
A. Burma: A Brief History of Injustice
Burma achieved independence from British colonial rule in
1948."3 From 1948 to 1962, Burma had a parliamentary democracy
under the elected leadership of Prime Minister U Nu, which ended
when General Ne Win overthrew him in a military coup. 14 Until
1988, Ne Win's military regime, the Burma Socialist Programme
Party (BSPP), held power. 15  Although there were political
demonstrations to express resistance to the BSPP's rule, the citizens
were effectively repressed through violence and the threat of
violence. 16 In addition, the country remained in isolation, virtually
unnoticed by the rest of the global community.' 7 The economy
continued to deteriorate and the situation reached "crisis
proportions."'
18
The Burmese citizens finally had enough. On August 8, 1988,
just two weeks before the Tienneman Square uprising in China, a
student-led demonstration was held in Rangoon, the capital of
Burma. 19 What began as a peaceful demonstration demanding the
replacement of the BSPP by a democratically elected government
soon ended in the death of thousands of demonstrators at the hands
of the military government.20 The government did respond to the
demonstrators a month later, declaring that the "State Law and Order
Restoration Council" (SLORC) had taken control of the country.21
There was no real difference between this "new" leadership and that
13. See Sendlenski, supra note 4, at 320.
14. See Miyaki-Murphy, supra note 5, at 831; see also BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
BURMA--COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2000, (Feb.
2001) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS] (noting that since 1962, active military
officers have held most of the important positions in all levels of government),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ls/hrrpt/2000/eap/678.htm (last visited
Mar. 23, 2002).
15. See COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 14.
16. See id.
17. See id.; see also Sendlenski, supra note 4, at 320-21.
18. Sendlenski, supra note 4, at 321.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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of the BSPP, and the civilian demonstrations that would follow
shared the same result as the student demonstration of August 8,
1988.2
In 1990, in an attempt to win over the allegiance of the Burmese
people, the SLORC held a free election.23 The National League for
Democracy, headed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace
Prize Winner who had been under house arrest since 1989,24 won
392 of 485 parliamentary seats; while the National Union Party,
supported by the SLORC, won only 10 seats.25 Despite the vote, the
SLORC refused to hand over power to the National League for
Democracy.26 The Burmese government has since imposed a ban on
the formation or existence of opposition parties and on public
meetings.
2 7
Since 1990, the condition of the country has gone from bad to
worse. The junta, a group of ruling military officials, has cultivated
a successful drug trade that comprises most of the country's income,
mainly through the exportation of heroin and opium. 28 The health
conditions of the country are very harsh29 and equally appalling are
the political conditions. Human rights violations by the government
are a frequent occurrence, with the erection of forced labor camps
and the widespread use of child labor,30 torture and other inhumane
22. See id.
23. See id. at 321-22.
24. See CIA, The World Fact Book-Burma, at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bm.html (last visited Mar.
18, 2002). She was under house arrest until 1995, was rearrested in September
2000, and has remained under house arrest since.
25. See Sendlenski, supra note 4, at 321-22; see also Miyaki-Murphy,
supra note 5, at 831.
26. See Miyaki-Murphy, supra note 5, at 831.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 832. In fact, it is estimated that over sixty percent of the
heroin sold in the United States comes from Burma. See id.
29. See CIA, supra note 24. The AIDS epidemic has hit Burma hard,
accounting for about 48,000 deaths in 1999. See id.
30. See S. 926, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(A) (2001); see also COUNTRY
REPORTS, supra note 14 (indicating that forced labor was used to support the
public works and military). In 1997, the Burmese government filed an
objection with the U.N. secretariat of the Commission on Human Rights
regarding the use of the term "forced labor." They did, however, acknowledge
that "'citizens are upon occasion requested to donate their labor."' KATARINA
ToMAgEvsKI, RESPONDING TO HuMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: 1946-1999 211
(2000).
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forms of punishment, the disappearance of political activists,3 1 the
use of "arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile,"32 the "denial of fair
public trials,"33 and the "use of excessive force and violations of
humanitarian law in internal conflicts."34  Additionally, without
democratic political process, there can be no change for the people of
Burma by the people of Burma.35 Despite the condemnation of the
SLORC and its ruling government by the United Nations Human
Rights Commission and various nations, there has been no
perceptible change in the situation.
36
It is this dire situation in Burma that prompted the
Massachusetts legislature to adopt what it termed "An Act
Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or
in Burma (Myanmar). 37 At the urging of Suu Kyi, who also asked
international companies to stop investing in Burma, Massachusetts
(and several American cities following Massachusetts's lead)
enacted selective purchasing legislation.38  This legislation was
designed to economically force the Burmese government to heed the
desires of its citizens, and to recognize the choice those citizens
made for democracy, as well as ending human rights violations in
Burma.
39
31. See Sendlenski, supra note 4, at 323; see also COUNTRY REPORTS,
supra note 14, at § 1(c) (Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment:
The most common forms of mistreatment were sleep and food
deprivation coupled with around-the-clock questioning under bright
lights... [o]fficials place metal rods between prisoners' fingers and
squeeze them in an attempt to injure the prisoners' hands; hot wax
also is poured on the prisoners' backs.).
32. Sendlenski, supra note 4, at 323; see also COUNTRY REPORTS, supra
note 14.
33. Sendlenski, supra note 4, at 323.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 326.
36. See Miyaki-Murphy, supra note 5, at 832.
37. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366-67 (2000).
38. See Miyaki-Murphy, supra note 5, at 832.
39. See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (West 1996
& Supp. 2001) (from the provisions and stipulations in the Massachusetts law,
it is clear the legislature intended to force change in Burma by affecting the
government economically).
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B. Sanctions, in Three Acts
The Massachusetts law "generally bars state entities from
buying goods or services from any person (defined to include a
business organization) identified on a 'restricted purchase list' of
those doing business with Burma." 40 At the time the National
Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) filed its complaint in National
Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,4 1 the restricted companies on the
list numbered 346; of these, forty-four were American companies.
42
The state law seemed to work. By the end of its first week of
enactment, several U.S. companies pulled out of Burma, citing the
law as the stimulus of such actions.43 The Supreme Court noted that
the Massachusetts statute was broad in its definition of what exactly
constituted "doing business" with Burma.44
As stipulated by the Massachusetts law, should a state contract
be entered into with a company on the restricted purchase -list, the
contract would be void.45 The law charged the State Secretary of
Administration and Finance4 6 with the responsibility of creating and
maintaining the list.47 The statute also instructed that the list be
updated "at least once every three months. 48 If a company wanted
to bid on a contract with the state of Massachusetts, it would have to
submit a sworn declaration providing information on any business it
was already conducting with the Burmese government.4 1 Thus, the
law gave a clear ultimatum to those companies in business with
40. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 367.
41. 181 F.3d 38 (9th Cir. 1999).
42. See Miyaki-Murphy, supra note 5, at 835.
43. See id. at 833.
44. MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN., ch. 7, § 22G (West 1996 & Supp. 2001). The
statute defines the "Government of Burma" to mean "any public or quasi-
public entity operating within Burma... including, but not limited to,
municipal, provincial, national or other governmental and military bodies,
including all departments and agencies of such bodies, public utilities, public
facilities, or any national corporation in which Burma... has a financial
interest or operational responsibilities." Id.
45. See id. § 22L.
46. See id. § 22G.
47. See id. § 22J. The list shall be established using information derived
from the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the Associates to Develop
Democratic Burma, United Nations reports, and "other reliable sources." Id. §
22J(b).
48. Id. § 22J(c).
49. See Miyaki-Murphy, supra note 5, at 836.
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Burma who wished to also contract with Massachusetts state
agencies.
In September of 1996, Congress passed a statute that imposed
sanctions on Burma similar to those set out in the Massachusetts
law.5 0 There were three sanctions defined in this federal statute. It
restricted aid to the government of Burma l and required federal
representatives of "international financial institutions" to vote against
proposed financial assistance to Burma.5 2  It also prohibited the
issuance of visas to Burmese government officials who did not fall
into one of two allowed criteria: officials whose presence was
required by treaty, and officials who were part of a "Burmese
mission to the United Nations." 53 The federal statute gave discretion
to the Executive Office in determining when the sanctions may be
lifted. 4
Along with the discretion to determine when the sanctions
should be lifted, the President also was given the discretion to
prohibit individuals in the United States from initiating "new
investment" in Burma, as set out in the second series of sanctions.
5 5
50. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to
3009-167, enacted by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, § 101(c),
110 Stat. 3009-121 to 3009-172 (1997).
51. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 368. The Court notes that the Act does,
however, allow humanitarian aid, as well as "counternarcotics efforts" and
"promotion of human rights and democracy." Id. at 368. The resemblance to
the Massachusetts law, § 221, is obvious. Section 221 of the Massachusetts law
allowed for the shipment of specific medical supplies to Burma. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 221 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001).
52. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 368.
53. Id.
54. See id. The Court further explains the President's discretionary powers
under the federal statute: "These restrictions are to remain in effect [u]ntil
such time as the President determines and certifies to Congress that Burma has
made measurable and substantial progress in improving human rights practices
and implementing democratic government." Id.
55. See id. at 369. The Act defines "new investment" as:
[E]ntry into a contract that would favor the 'economical
development of resources located in Burma,' or would provide
ownership interests in or benefits from such development.., but the
term specifically excludes (and thus excludes from any Presidential
prohibition) 'entry into, performance of, or financing of a contract to
sell or purchase goods, services, or technology.'
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Furthermore, the statute required that the President prohibit
investment by such persons if he "determines and certifies to
Congress that the Burmese Government has physically harmed,
rearrested, or exiled Daw Aung San Suu Kyi... or has committed
'large-scale repression of or violence against the Democratic
opposition."'
56
It is important to note here the difference between the terms of
the federal statute and the Massachusetts law, in that the
Massachusetts law prohibits doing business with corporations and
companies already in Burma-for example, doing business with the
Burmese government, according to the terms of the Massachusetts
law.57 The federal statute, in contrast, prohibits new investment, but
does not specifically address existing contracts or contracts that may
be renewed.58 It is apparent that this federal statute adopted a more
political, less economic method of dissuading the Burmese
government from continuing its injustices.
59
The third set of sanctions required the President to "develop 'a
comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and
improve human rights practices and the quality of life in Burma[,]'
working with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and other countries who have financial interests in Burma.60 The
President was also directed to work toward the goal of establishing a
dialogue between SLORC and democratic groups in Burma.
6 1
In May of 1997, when President Clinton issued the Burma
Executive Order under the power granted to him by Congress
through the federal statute discussed above, the sanctions went into
56. Id. In May of 1997, President Clinton certified, in compliance with the
Act and upon issuance of the Burma Executive Order, that the Burmese
government had repressed democratic opposition and that their actions were to
be considered a threat to the United States' national security and foreign
policy. See id. at 370. This threat was termed a national emergency. See id.
57. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 7, §§ 22G-M (West 1996 & Supp.
2001).
58. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369.
59. It will become clear in the analysis of the Burma Freedom Act to be
considered in Congress, that the United States is now willing to adopt a more
economic approach, similar to the Massachusetts law, to convince the Burmese
government to change its ways.
60. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369.
61. See id.
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effect.62 There was to be no new investment in Burma by U.S.
persons and a prohibition against approving or allowing new
investment by foreign parties was also triggered.63 The issuance of
this order, and the federal statute in general, tolled the end for the
Massachusetts law and other similar state laws.
64
On May 22, 2001, four years after President Clinton's issuance
of the Executive Order under the federal statute discussed above, and
a year after the Massachusetts law was struck down in the Crosby
case,65 a bill was introduced in the Senate and referred to the
Committee on Finance.66 This bill (the companion bill to the Burma
Freedom Act that would be introduced in the House and referred to
the Committee on Ways and Means one month later)67 is intended
"[t]o prohibit the importation of any article that is produced,
manufactured, or grown in Burma."68 The House bill expresses the
69same goal. In a similar vein to the Massachusetts law, the bill
imposes an economic sanction on Burma, although not directly
through the boycott of businesses that contract with the Burmese
government.7 ° Instead, the Burma Freedom Act blocks any products,
62. See supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also Crosby, 530 U.S. at
370.
63. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 370. The President delegated the authority to
work with ASEAN on the development of "a strategy for democracy, human
rights, and the quality of life in Burma" as well as filing the necessary
Congressional reports to the Secretary of State. Id. To the Secretary of the
Treasury, President Clinton granted the authority to implement the designed
policy "in consultation with the Secretary of State." Id. at 370 n.3. The
Secretary of the Treasury implemented this Executive Order one year later.
See id.
64. The NFTC filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts against Massachusetts state officials. See id. at 371. The
Council argued that the state law was unconstitutional in its violation of the
Foreign Commerce Clause, and that it was also preempted by the federal
statute. See id. at 368, 370-71 (discussing National Foreign Trade Council v.
Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999)).
65. See id. (holding that the Massachusetts statute conflicted with
Congress's grant of authority to the President and was preempted under the
Supremacy Clause).
66. See S. 926, 107th Cong. (2001).
67. See H.R. 2211, 107th Cong. (2001).
68. S. 926.
69. See H.R. 2211.
70. See id. § 3(a)(1).
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presumably including the merchandise that results from such
contracts, from entering the United States.71
The Burma Freedom Act is the response to a resolution adopted
by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 2000, requiring
Burma's State Peace and Development Council to "take concrete
actions to end forced labor in Burma."
72
More importantly, the Burma Freedom Act is not an arbitrary
sanction the ILO and the United States government simply felt
compelled to impose for their own political reasons. The call for
sanctions comes from the people of Burma themselves, the ones who
would potentially suffer from economic distress due to the
impositions of sanctions, but who would apparently choose that
suffering over the suffering they experience at the hands of the
military junta.73 The leaders of the Burmese opposition, the National
League for Democracy, have made the call to the international
community to institute sanctions against the Burmese government:
We would like the world to know that economic
sanctions do not hurt the common people of Burma. When
Burma was opened up to what they called the market economy
a decade ago, it did not open a door for the common people of
Burma. What it did was to give the military authorities and
those connected with them a chance to consolidate their
economic position in the same way in which they had
consolidated their power base. This is why we think that
economic sanctions are good and necessary for the fast
democratization of Burma.
74
71. See id.
72. H.R. 2211 § 2; S. 926 § 1.
73. See Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Statement: "For Us, Every Day is a
Special Day for Democracy," in THE BURMA FUND (Sept. 1999), at
http://www.burmafund.org/Pathfinders/nld/ASSK/Economic%20sanctions%20
are%20necessary.htm.
74. Id. As Daw Aung San Suu Kyi explains, the decision to support
sanctions was a difficult one:
We... hesitated before endorsing the movement for economic
sanctions several years ago. We... wanted to give the military
authorities a chance to prove that they were sincere in their claim that
they too were working for democracy. However, as it became obvious
that the military authorities were not interested in bringing democracy
to Burma... we decided that economic sanctions were necessary.
June 2002] 1305
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In considering such legislation as the Burma Freedom Act, the
United States is affirmatively answering a request to impose
sanctions on Burma in order to bring about democracy within that
country.
As stated before, the Burma Freedom Act is a sort of synthesis
between the defeated Massachusetts law and the 1996 federal
statute.75 Like the 1996 federal statute, the Burma Freedom Act does
not mention existing contracts with the Burmese government; but,
unlike the statute, the Burma Freedom Act does not discuss new
investments either.76 In complete opposition to the 1996 federal
statute, which did not prohibit the performance of a contract to sell or
purchase goods from Burma, 77 the Burma Freedom Act calls for an
absolute trade ban against any "article that is produced,
manufactured, or grown in Burma."78 Based on principles that echo
the economic position taken by the Massachusetts legislature in
drafting the Massachusetts law, the Burma Freedom Act goes farther
than the 1996 federal statute in that it truly does, in simple terms, hit
the Burmese government where it hurts. Burma's place in the global
market is predicated upon the products it produces under contracts
with international sources that take advantage of Burma's cheap
labor costs. 79 The imposition of sanctions on such products would
have a major effect on the Burmese economy, as it would be a rather
easy decision for international parties to pick up and move their
operations to another developing country with equally cheap labor.
The imposition of sanctions also impacts the deals Burma has
struck with Unocal, which has been utilizing Burma's rich well of
resources, building a pipeline through the Burmese rain forests to
gather oil in its Yadana Gas Pipeline Project-the single largest
foreign investment project in Burma-and selling the fuel in the
United States. 80 Under the broad auspices of the Burma Freedom
75. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
76. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 369 (2000);
H.R. 2211 § 3(a)(1); S. 926 § 2(a)(1).
77. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
78. H.R. 2211 § 3(a)(1); S. 926 § 2(a)(1).
79. See TOMAgEVSKI, supra note 30, at 188, 204-13.
80. See EarthRights International, Burma Project: Yadana Natural Gas
Pipeline Project, at http://www.earthrights.orgfburma/yadana.html (last
updated Nov. 19, 2001). For Unocal's position on the Pipeline project, see
1306
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Act, it is conceivable that gas from the pipeline would be restricted
from entering the United States as a product from Burma.8 Should
such a lucrative business relationship with Unocal come to an end,
and if Unocal were forced to pull out of Burma, this would be a
significantly debilitating blow to the Burmese government.
82
Also similar to the 1996 federal statute is the Burma Freedom
Act's deference to the President in determining when the sanctions
should be lifted. 3 The Burma Freedom Act, however, does not give
the President the authority to prohibit trade or investment, as did the
1996 federal statute. The authority to do so comes directly from
Congress. 84 Although the authority is different, the message sent by
such a resolution is the same in the Burma Freedom Act and the
federal statute: the United States condemns the actions of the
Burmese government against its citizens, and refuses to support such
a regime.
5
C. Considering the Burma Freedom Act Under the Constitutional
Analysis ofCrosby v. NFTC
In considering the constitutionality of the Massachusetts law in
Crosby, the Supreme Court emphasized that, "[w]hen Congress
intends federal law to 'occupy the field,' state law in that area is
preempted., 86 The Court held that the Massachusetts law was a
stumbling block to Congress's ability to accomplish its objectives.
Unocal, The story you haven't heard about... Unocal in Myanmar, at
http://www.unocal.com/myanmar/index.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2002).
81. See H.R. 2211 § 3(a)(1); S. 926 § 2(a)(1).
82. On June 11, 2002, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Victoria Gerrard
Chaney ruled that Unocal "could be tried for human rights violations,
including forced labor, that allegedly occurred during construction of [the
pipeline]." Lisa Girion, Judge OKs Unocal Abuse Lawsuit, L.A. TIMEs, June
12, 2002, at Cl. This is an important development, since Unocal is not being
tried for direct liability, but for vicarious liability due to its support of the
Burmese military government. "[I]f they are held liable, it means that
companies are going to be held by the courts to the same standards that they
are held to in this country .... And companies will not be able to go abroad
and take advantage of the much looser regulatory environment or the
corruption of the government to treat their workers in an inhumane way." Id.
atC6.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See H.R. 2211 §§ 2, 3; S. 926.
86. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
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It is clear that the Burma Freedom Act does not face defeat
under the constitutional analysis conducted by the Court in Crosby.
8 7
As a federal statute, it is not subject to the same fate as the
Massachusetts law, in that it is not preempted, which was the major
fault the Court found with the Massachusetts law, and was ultimately
what led to its end.88 The Court in Crosby was also urged to strike
down the Massachusetts law for violating the Foreign Affairs
doctrine and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. However, the Court found no need to address these
issues since the preemption argument was enough to defeat the state
legislation. 89 Nevertheless, consideration of these issues regarding
the Burma Freedom Act would not lead to any constitutional issues
anyway. The Foreign Affairs doctrine has been interpreted by the
Court to confer the power to conduct affairs with other nations upon
the federal government.90 Thus, the Burma Freedom Act is well
within Congress's authority, as it is the result of a decision by the
federal government to conduct affairs with Burma in a particular
way.91 Arguably, this is a constitutional exercise of congressional
power.
Likewise, the Foreign Commerce Clause is in no way violated
by the Burma Freedom Act. The Foreign Commerce Clause of the
Constitution grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." 92  The Burma Freedom Act does precisely that, as it
regulates commerce with the nation of Burma, prohibiting trade until
the Burmese government satisfies the required stipulations. 93 Thus,
the Burma Freedom Act is a perfectly constitutional exercise of the
federal government's power under the Foreign Commerce Clause.
The proposed congressional bills pass the rigors of the Crosby
analysis, but that does not mean that they have the ability to survive.
They may potentially face a different kind of challenge in the World
87. See id.
88. See id. at 3 73-74.
89. See id. at 374 n.8.
90. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 1-3; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
93. See Burma Freedom Act, H.R. 2211, 107th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (1st Sess.
2001); S. 926, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2001).
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Trade Organization, and this challenge could prevent them from ever
effectively changing the political situation in Burma.
III. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE "HUMAN RIGHTS
PRINCIPLE" GOES HEAD TO HEAD WITH THE "TRIBUNALS OF
GLOBALIZATION"
94
A. The World Trade Organization and its Stance on Sanctions
The creation of the WTO heralds an important change in
international trade law: regulation is now found in "treaty-based
rules." 95 This means that there is "less room for state discretion and
unilateral action"--the very action that enabled the United States to
impose sanctions against South Africa, and now enables it to impose
sanctions against Burma.96 Should a nation like the United States
impose a sanction against the WTO, such as the Burma Freedom
Act, other nations would most likely challenge it in a WTO
proceeding, which was done against the Massachusetts legislation, as
cited in Crosby.97 The basis for challenging such a measure would
probably be that it violates most-favored-nation rules and national
treatment rules.98
The issue is not just that the WTO prohibits member nations
from imposing sanctions on other nations based on human rights
principles. The WTO has angered many by refusing to use its power
94. See Frank J. Garcia, The Global Market and Hwnan Rights: Trading
Away the Hwnan Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 51, 54 (1999).
95. Id. at 62.
96. See id.
97. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 383-84
(2000).
This point has been consistently echoed in the State Department:
"While the [Massachusetts sanctions on Burma] were adopted in
pursuit of a noble goal ... these measures also risk shifting the focus
of the debate.., away from the best way to bring pressure against the
[SLORC] to a potential WTO dispute over its consistency with our
international obligations."
Id. at 384.
98. See Garcia, supra note 94, at 78. Professor Garcia goes on to
hypothesize that "[t]he challenged measure would be determined aprimafacia
Article I violation... [and] aprimafacia Article III violation [under GATT]."
Id.
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to aid in the struggle for human rights by setting standards. 99
Standards set by a body like the WTO would be tremendously
effective, and it is easy to see why. It controls the economic dealings
of nations through potential economic sanctions, and because these
nations want to continue to receive the economic benefits that the
WTO provides, they would be under great pressure to comply with
any requirements imposed by the WTO. 00 It is clear that the WTO
could easily use its power for good. However, the WTO takes a
"business-first" approach to the global market, and this approach
leaves no room for the consideration of less economic concepts like
human rights.l1
0
The WTO has directly addressed the accusation that it "tramples
over labor and human rights."'10 2 It claims to resist including labor
standards in its rules because member nations regard such standards
as nothing more than a "guise for protectionism in developed-
country markets" and that "sanctions imposed against countries with
lower labour standards would merely perpetuate poverty and delay
99. See The World Trade Organisation and Human Rights, POSITION
PAPER, FEDtRATION INTERNATIONALE DES LIGUES DES DROITS DE L'HOMME,
Nov. 1999, [hereinafter POSITION PAPER], available at
http://www.fidh.imaginet.fr/rapports/wto-fidh.htm.
100. See BERNARD M. HoEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 36-55
(1995) (explaining the function and effectiveness of the WTO, including its
transparency policy and method of dispute settlement); see also BHARGIRATH
LAL DAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WTO AGREEMENTS 7 (1998) (stating
that the WTO's main objective "is to provide full competitive opportunity of
trade among the member countries"). See generally BERNARD M. HOEKMAN,
TRADE LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS: GOOD PRACTICES AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (1995) (discussing the effectiveness of the WTO; focusing on
its dispute resolution mechanism and trade agreements and procedures).
101. In his Wincott Lecture, Professor Jagdish Bhagwati explains the WTO's
rationale for declining to determine labor or environmental standards, or
prohibitions against human rights violations, including child labor. See
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE, 'FAIRNESS' AND THE NEW
PROTECTIONISM: REFLECTIONS ON AN AGENDA FOR THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 17-32 (1994). Professor Bhagwati also discusses other options
for countries who want to "advance their own views of what are 'good' labour
standards," such as private boycotts like those advocated by Mahatma Gandhi
and Martin Luther King, Jr. Id. at 32.
102. World Trade Organization, Top 10 Reasons to Oppose the World Trade
Organization: Criticism, yes... misinformation, no!, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min99_e/english/misinf e/031a
b-e.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Top 10].
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improvements in workplace standards."' 0 3  The former argument,
that the WTO's member nations regard labor standards as nothing
more than a guise, seems to fuel the very accusation the WTO is
trying to refute-that free trade comes before the rights of people
living under oppressive conditions. 10 4  The concern is that such
regulation would limit the competition between nations that have
strong labor laws and those nations that have lax ones.1
0 5
Preservation of this competition ranks higher than preventing the
exploitation of workers in developing nations; in fact, preservation of
this competition depends on the exploitation of workers.
The success of a campaign like the one waged upon South
Africa during the Apartheid era can refute the argument that
sanctions would only harm the very party it was designed to help.
10 6
In 1960, the American Committee on Africa began its sanction
campaign here in the U.S.'0 7 In 1986, Congress overrode President
Ronald Reagan's veto and imposed strict economic sanctions against
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See POSLTIONPAPER, supra note 99. But cf Ruth Mayne & Caroline Le
Quesne, Calls for a Social Trade, in GLOBAL TRADE AND GLOBAL SOCIAL
ISSUES 91 (1999) (arguing that the real price for cheap labor is paid by the
laborers themselves because investments in cheap labor lead to exacerbated
poverty and inequality).
106. There is a continuing and fascinating debate over the success and
importance of the sanctions against South Africa, and the role that campaign
played in bringing about the end of Apartheid. See generally HOW SANCTIONS
WORK: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA (Neta C. Crawford & Audie Klotz eds.,
1999) (discussing the campaign and analyzing the specific reasons for its
success); THE CASE FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA (United Nations
ed., 1982) (detailing more information regarding the view on the success of the
campaign adopted by this Note). To learn more about the opinion of the
opposing view, see generally ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
(Hans KSchler ed., 1997). To understand the United States government's
decision to terminate economic sanctions against South Africa, see generally
The Termination of Economic Sanctions Against South Africa: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and
Africa Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 102nd Cong.
(1991).
107. See generally Appendix: Chronology of Sanctions Against Apartheid, in
How SANCTIONS WORK: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA 283 (Neta Crawford
& Audie Klotz eds., 1999) [hereinafter Appendix].
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South Africa, 10 8 and in 1989, the largest remaining U.S. companies
in South Africa, Mobil and Goodyear, withdrew. 109
In his article, Professor Frank Garcia argues that human rights
are inalienable and take priority over economic concerns, an idea he
refers to as the "human rights principle."" 0  At odds with this
principle are the "tribunals of globalization," namely the WTO's
dispute settlement mechanism."' The WTO has not ruled on the
issue over trade with Burma, and in accordance with General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article 21, countries have
the right to follow U.N. decisions (as was the case with the sanctions
against South Africa under Apartheid). 1 2 The issue of unilateral
sanctions, such as those found under the Burma Freedom Act,
however, have not been addressed, and would presumably be
challenged under the WTO's charter since there is no U.N. decision
to impose sanctions against Burma in the way proposed by the
Burma Freedom Act.113 If there is a challenge to the imposition of
sanctions, the WTO might very well find that such sanctions are
illegal under its agreements. 1 4  As a member of the WTO, the
United States would then be forced to relinquish its right to enforce
sanctions against foreign governments that violate human rights and
maintain unfair labor practices and standards." 5 Without a U.N. call
to impose sanctions, the United States may consequently have to
continue its financial support of oppressive regimes like the Burmese
government.116
B. Why Bother? Considering the Productivity of Sanctions
Sanctions are a controversial creature. On one side, proponents
claim that sanctions imposed by some nations against other nations
committing civil rights violations can put a necessary strain on such
108. See South Africa's Apartheid Era and the Transition to Multiracial
Democracy, at http://www.facts.com/cd/o94317.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2002).
109. See Appendix, supra note 107, at 286.
110. See Garcia, supra note 94, at 51-56.
111. Id.
112. See Top 10, supra note 102.
113. See id.
114. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
116. See supra Part II.A.
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governments. 17  These sanctions can force them to end their
egregious activities and to act in accordance with the standards
delineated by the country imposing the sanctions.1 18  However,
opponents claim that the only people hurt by such sanctions are those
who are already the victims of their governments, for example, those
laborers who are being underpaid, and those civilians suffering under
an oppressive govemment. 19 Without buyers in the global market,
the laborers get even less because their government becomes even
more tight-fisted with the money it makes in exports. 20 Opponents
to sanctions point to countries like Cuba, where sanctions can be
interpreted as doing more harm than good.' 2 1 These arguments are
not without merit, but the difference between successful sanctions
and those unsuccessful campaigns that result in more harm than good
is pivotal in determining whether or not the imposition of sanctions
is a worthwhile endeavor.
Sanctions must be employed responsibly, or indeed they will
only end up hurting those they are meant to help.122 It is better to
discuss sanctions not in the abstract, but by looking at a real-world
example of a successful campaign, to discern what it is that makes
sanctions successful and why they are instrumental to maintaining
human rights. We can recognize several similarities between South
Africa and Burma. South Africa was ruled by an oppressive regime,
as Burma is today.123 The call for sanctions came from within South
Africa itself, with the full support of those living under the very
117. See Audie Klotz, Making Sanctions Work: Comparative Lessons, in
How SANCTIONS WORK: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA 264, 273-81 (Neta
Crawford & Audie Klotz eds., 1999).
118. See id.
119. See generally Ali M. Farfer, Sanctions and Development: Some
Hypotheses, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 13 (Hans K6chler
ed., 1997).
120. See id.
121. See generally Alfredo Puig, Economic Sanctions and Their Impact on
Development: The Case of Cuba, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND
DEVELOPMENT 65 (Hans K6chler ed., 1997).
122. See id.; see also Appendix, "Economic Sanctions and Human Rights":
Joint Appeal of NGOs, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 70, 70-
73 (Hans K6chler ed., 1997).
123. See Neta C. Crawford, Trwnp Card or Theater?: An Introduction to
Two Sanctions Debates, in HOW SANCTIONS WORK: LESSONS FROM SOUTH
AFRICA 3, 6-9 (Neta Crawford & Audie Klotz eds., 1999); see also Appendix,
supra note 107, at 283-87.
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conditions the sanctions were designed to remove. 124 The sanctions
were not independently imposed upon South Africa at the discretion
of the U.S. and other governments and organizations. 125 Rather, they
were a response to the request of the people of South Africa:
One of the strongest arguments against the use of
economic sanctions is that often ordinary people in the
target state-rather than the political elite-are most hurt.
This unintended effect may be counterproductive,
especially if sanctions begin to lose popular support within
the target state as a result of job losses and deepening
poverty. It is important to keep in mind, therefore, that in
the South African case, the call for isolation was part of the
overall political strategy of the internal black opposition.
126
In passing legislation such as the Burma Freedom Act, the United
States is affirmatively answering a request to impose sanctions on
Burma to bring about democracy within that country. As was the
case in South Africa, the request for sanctions is internal, coming
from the people within the troubled country. 127 By doing things
according to the method recommended by the Burmese people, the
U.S. can help countries such as Burma achieve success through
sanctions. This is the responsible way to implement sanctions, and
that responsibility is the key to their success.
It is ironic that although the WTO downplays and even doubts
the effectiveness of sanctions, 128 it does not hesitate to use them to
force nations to comply with its regulations: "Under article 22.2 of
the WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, the final means of vindicating a claim against
a non-complying member is the imposition of unilateral, retaliatory
sanctions by any other nation that may choose to impose such
sanctions." 2 9 It is ironic because the WTO does, after all, believe in
124. See generally Tshidiso Maloka, "Sanctions Hurt but Apartheid Kills! ":
The Sanctions Campaign and Black Workers, in HOW SANCTIONS WORK:
LESsoNs FROM SouTH AFRICA 178 (Neta Crawford & Audie Klotz eds.,
1999).
125. See Appendix, supra note 107, at 283-87.
126. Maloka, supra note 124, at 178.
127. See Aung San Suu Kyi, supra note 73; see also supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
128. See Top 10, supra note 102.
129. Hearing, supra note 12.
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stronger nation protecting a weaker one. This possibility strikes at
the core of the constitutional principles mentioned by the Court in
Crosby, and discussed earlier in this Note. 137 Under the Foreign
Affairs Power and Foreign Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, the power to make decisions regarding issues with
foreign nations on any ground138 and to regulate commerce with
other nations' 39 is held by the federal government--Congress. The
danger is that the WTO could potentially strip the U.S. federal
government of this power, this right uxider the Constitution, if it
prohibits its member nations from imposing sanctions based on
human rights violations. 140  This would restrict the U.S.
government's ability to make decisions regarding foreign affairs and
commerce. In fact, its decisions would have already been made by
the WTO-impose no sanctions, pay no mind to the violations of
human rights. In essence, the U.S. Constitution is dismissed in
deference to the regulations of the WTO:
Although the WTO is still of recent origin it yields
considerable (and unexpected) power. The substantive
terms of its agreements limit the scope of action for national
regulation, stripping power away from states. Its enhanced
dispute resolution mimics a form of hierarchical
supremacy: WTO rules act as a super-constitutional text
with a force superior to ordinary national enactments. Once
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body finds that a national
measure is inconsistent with a WTO obligation, the WTO
member is expected to bring its law into conformity ....
[T]he mark of WTO supremacy is apparent: national law is
expected to give way.1
4 '
The question is no longer whether the U.S. should sacrifice saving
Burma for the benefits of free trade, but rather whether free trade is
137. See supra Part II.C.
138. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
139. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
140. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
141. Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv.
451, 452 (2001); see also Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty,
Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 2 CIE. J. INT'L L.
403, 403 (2001) (stating that "[the United States] must continue to balance and
rebalance a defense of national sovereignty against grants of authority over
economic and social policy to international organizations such as the WTO.").
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the effectiveness of sanctions, but will only allow the use of
sanctions to further economic and business interests. 30 Sanctions
can be used to protect the trading rights of nations in a free market,
but not to protect the lives of workers or political prisoners.
31
C. The Potential Conflict to Come: Implications and Consequences
Professor Garcia points out that although market globalization
has the potential to present an opportunity for human rights law, such
as the implementation of labor standards, "the globalization of the
market economy may also pose a threat to the continued
effectiveness of human rights law, just as the rise of the market
economy itself has been blamed for leading to conditions requiring
the formal development of human rights law."132 The WTO has
made no motion to incorporate labor standards into its agreements,
and the question of sanctions based upon human rights violations has
yet to be addressed.1
33
Whether the WTO will oppose trade sanctions against Burma
remains to be seen.' 34 If its charter is taken literally, any type of
sanction would be opposed simply on the principle that it prohibits
free trade. 135 However, the WTO has indicated that it recognizes the
need to uphold labor standards in order to gain international trust-
which it obviously does not have, as evidenced by the Seattle riots
and other similar social demonstrations.
136
The possibility of having to submit to the rules of the WTO in
this situation has broader implications than simply the morality of a
130. See id. (stating that "the question before us is not 'Can economic
sanctions work?' It is, 'Why do we use sanctions to protect software, but not
human life; to protect musical recordings but not the rights of religious
believers, workers, and political prisoners; to stop movie piracy, but not
torture?"').
131. See Hearing, supra note 12.
132. Garcia, supra note 94, at 53.
133. See POSITION PAPER, supra note 99.
134. See supra Part III.A.
135. See Yuji Iwasata, Lawfulness of Unilateral Economic Retaliation Under
International Law, in WTO & ASIA-PACIFIC-THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AND
THE EXPANDING BORDERS OF THE WTO: IMPLICATIONS, CHALLENGES, AND
OPPORTUNITIES 75, 81-85 (Mark A. Buchanan ed., 1996).
136. See Pierre Marc Johnson, Creating Sustainable Global Governance, in
GUIDING GLOBAL ORDER: G8 GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
245, 245-46 (John J. Kirton et al. eds., 2001).
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worth sacrificing the most powerful government's constitutional
right to independently regulate foreign affairs and commerce.
D. An Ounce of Prevention
A WTO challenge has not yet occurred, and it would be useful
to consider steps the United States could take to fend off WTO
action. Claude Barfield suggests "increasing the democratic
accountability and legitimacy of the WTO" through a congressional
commission that would have two responsibilities: first, "to report on
the implications of the WTO dispute settlement system on the U.S.
constitutional system and on U.S. domestic laws and regulations,"
and second, "to report on the' cumulative impact of rulings,
pronouncements, and resolutions that have emerged from...
organizations such as... the International Labor Organization."'
142
The result would be an enhanced awareness for the federal
government regarding the effects of international policy on the
143United States' domestic policy.
Another effective measure would be greater support of those
non-government organizations (NGOs) already working to force the
WTO to incorporate labor and human rights standards into its
agreements. If the U.S. government wants to enjoy sovereignty
while simultaneously reaping the benefits of membership in the
WTO, it should consider using its weight to encourage changes in the
WTO agreements.' There are NGOs throughout the world that have
been pushing for such change since the inception of the WTO; The
United States should join forces with other member nations of the
WTO and demand that the WTO include trade and labor standards in
the agreements. If the WTO's members fight for such standards, the
WTO will no doubt have to comply-it is nothing without its
members. The United States enjoys a comfortable position in the
WTO; this country is a powerful player in global trade and
economics. The United States, therefore, is in a prime position to
take steps to institute change in the WTO that will not only lead to
improved labor and human rights in countries such as Burma, but
will also lead to a preservation of sovereignty for governments like
the United States.
142. Barfield, supra note 141, at 414.
143. See id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The potential consequences of the U.S. government's actions
raise some frightening questions: In pursuit of free trade in a global
market, will the United States be forced to compromise its ideal of
democracy? Is cheaper labor worth the cost of abandoning the
principle of freedom that is the foundation of the U.S. Constitution?
The Burma Freedom Act is emblematic of the deep moral
consciousness and social responsibility at the heart of the American
ideals preserved in the Constitution, and the canons of law which
have their foundation therein. As Representative Christopher H.
Smith states, "We must not abandon the American ideals of freedom
and democracy for the sake of marginally cheaper consumer goods
and access to cheap labor. We must condition expanded trade
relations upon at least minimal respect for fundamental human rights.
American interests and American values demand no less."'144 Indeed,
enactment of the Burma Freedom Act would signal the U.S.
government's agreement with this assessment.
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